Alan Turing, in his famous 1950 paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” wrote, “we can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.” This sentiment, expressed nearly 70 years ago in the context of whether machines can think, reflects the current momentum of recent technological breakthroughs to endow machines with the ability to make intelligent decisions — the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI). While the notion of AI is not novel, it has recently become a driving factor in industry because of compounded advancements in the availability of big data, machine learning approaches and algorithms, and powerful computing mechanisms.
Three-dimensional (3D) bioprinting offers the exciting prospect of printing 3D multicellular human organs by combining a host of specialisms, including software development, biotechnology and tort law. 3D bioprinting methods rely on highly specialized computer software that incorporates computer-aided design (CAD). Optimizing development of CAD software is paramount to the quality of the final bioprinted organ.
In the U.S., under the Lanham Act, to establish infringement of a registered mark under section 32 or an unregistered mark under section 43, the plaintiff must show ownership of a valid mark and that the defendant’s use of the mark in connection with goods or services causes a “likelihood of confusion.” With regard to infringement, the likelihood of consumer confusion has been called “the litmus test” or “touchstone” for establishing trademark liability.
Citing supposed harms to competition among Internet service providers, the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order reverses a decade long push to implement a regime of broadband regulation protecting net neutrality. However, the 2017 Order failed to recognize non-pecuniary interests in its sweeping change. Critical infrastructure, national security, and democracy all rely on a free and open Internet.
Many believe that open source innovation works “faster, better and cheaper” than conventional, proprietary innovation. The success of open source innovation has been seen primarily in open source software (OSS), whose output is an intangible, digital product (bits). This paper asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an open source hardware (OSH) environment, which involves tangible products (atoms). Specifically, it considers whether the tangible nature of OSH products presents legal or practical obstacles to their successful commercial implementation, in an environment where no appropriable IP rights exist. To answer these questions, the paper follows the innovation knowledge flow generated by an OSH invention and examines the legal structure and enforceability of open hardware license. It further considers in what way the absence of IP rights impacts the choice of a business model for OSH.
Hoping to spur the growth of the early Internet, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. The goal was to balance online service providers’ interests in avoiding secondary copyright liability based on their users’ online posts with Internet users’ interests in maintaining their right to fair use of copyrighted material online. Twenty years later, the evidence demonstrates that the DMCA has skewed too far towards protecting providers of online services at the expense of fair use. This has resulted in unnecessary chilling of otherwise protected speech. Specifically, under the DMCA, putative copyright holders may immediately force down any content they deem to be infringing, regardless of fair use considerations. To address this imbalance, Congress should amend § 512 to eliminate the automatic takedown period so that no material comes down until the poster has had a reasonable opportunity to present his or her fair use defense.
In response to political pressure, Congress has been seeking solutions to control drug prices and make it easier for consumers to afford pharmaceuticals. The legislative response to this concern was the Biosimilar, Price, Competition, and Innovation ACT (“BCPIA”). This act allows the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to accelerate the approval pathway for biosimilar drugs that effectively act as generic drugs (“generics”). This note analyzes how courts have handled the following three outstanding issues with the BCPIA: (1) whether compliance with the BCPIA is required or optional; (2) whether an applicant needs to wait until after the FDA approves a drug to notify the creator of the patented product of their intent to market the biologic; and (3) whether the applicant needs to participate in the entire process.
Privacy can be difficult for people to conceptualize, including for the policymakers charged with designing, interpreting, and enforcing privacy law. In both consumer privacy law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the privacy protections afforded to individuals are shaped by the ability of governmental decision-makers to assess privacy preferences, expectations, and behaviors, which they are rarely in a position to do accurately.
The race to develop artificial intelligence has begun, where countries are heavily backing efforts to be the world leader. While this technology promises to create a smarter, autonomous world, it is not without its concerns. Perhaps most prevalent are concerns regarding consumer personal data privacy and protection. While nations worldwide have adopted varying degrees of personal data protection, the European Union has established itself as the leader on this front.
The state statutory remedies for trade secret misappropriation and the new federal statutory remedies in the 2016 federal Defend Trade Secrets Act must be coordinated with both each other and with state enforcement of restrictive employment covenants. Whenever both statutory and contractual remedies are sought, a double monetary recovery for a single wrong must be avoided. A statutory remedy should not prohibit conduct that state restrictive employment covenant policy does not allow to be restricted. The fact that state restrictive covenant policy can protect confidential information that does not qualify for trade secret protection also must not be allowed to erode the statutory definition of trade secret.